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SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT: WHY 
IT MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO MODERATE 
THEIR SOCIAL MEDIA 
Alex Hadjian* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout 2017, seven Twitter users who posted criticism of 
President Donald J. Trump in comment threads begun by the 
President’s Twitter account “@realDonaldTrump” discovered that 
they were blocked from viewing, replying to, or otherwise interacting 
with @realDonaldTrump.1 In Knight First Amendment Institute v. 
Trump, these users brought suit against the President, alleging that 
President Trump and members of his staff violated the First 
Amendment by acting within their capacity as government officials to 
block the seven users in retaliation for their speech.2 The plaintiffs 
now attempt to establish two key points throughout their complaint: 
(1) President Trump’s use of the Twitter account was in his “official 
capacity rather than his personal one,” and therefore (2) Defendants 
engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint-based exclusion by blocking 
users from viewing or replying to @realDonaldTrump.3 
This developing case against President Trump raises the same 
question recently decided by a district court in Virginia: “[W]hen is a 
social media account maintained by a public official considered 
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California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor Aaron Caplan for his guidance, encouragement, 
patience, and witty constructive criticism. Special thanks to Professor Marcy Strauss as well in 
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also like to thank my friend, Jessica Hicks, as well as the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
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my mother, Nirva, and my father, Ara, for their continued love and support. 
 1. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 16–23, Knight First Amendment 
Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 17-cv-05205) 
[hereinafter Complaint].  
 2. See id. at 1–3. 
 3. See id. at 3, 13. 
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‘governmental’ in nature, and thus subject to constitutional 
constraints?”4 In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors,5 
the court reasoned that: (1) Defendant, an elected public official, 
utilized a social media platform as a “tool of governance”6 and 
therefore (2) Defendant’s blocking of a private citizen for an offensive 
comment on social media violated the First Amendment.7 
If theoretically extended and applied to cases such as President 
Trump’s, Davison would have courts examine certain factors under a 
totality of the circumstances test when determining if government 
officials have sufficiently acted in an “official capacity” through social 
media.8 If nothing else, the methodology and factors the court 
considered to reach its verdict make Davison an instructive blueprint 
for future jurisprudence where government officials’ use of social 
media platforms is concerned. Defining the limits of how government 
officials can utilize social media is important because social media 
allows officials to reach a public whose lives are increasingly spent 
online.9 Such elaboration not only facilitates efficient dissemination 
of the official’s particular policy agendas, but allows private citizens 
to engage with officials directly on such matters of public import.10 
Part II of this Comment lays out the pertinent facts of Davison. 
Part III explains the reasoning of the court in its ultimate holding. Part 
IV examines the Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence in this 
area of law and concludes that the court’s reasoning in Davison 
comports with that jurisprudence. Part IV also argues that the decision 
provides a practical and desirable methodology for future courts. Part 
IV concludes by applying Davison to the facts of the case against 
President Trump to illustrate the above points. Part V closes with the 
assertion that Davison is an instructive and even viable model for 
future cases in this area. 
 
 4. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. Va. 2017), 
aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 5. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
 6. Id. at 713. 
 7. Id. at 718. 
 8. See id. at 711–12. 
 9. See Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media Update 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 11, 
2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016. 
 10. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2003–10 (2011). 
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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Davison case arose in the context of Facebook,11 a social 
media platform used by “[r]oughly eight-in-ten online Americans.”12 
Plaintiff Brian C. Davison’s allegation stems from an incident where 
Defendant Loudoun County Board of Supervisors’ Chair, Phyllis J. 
Randall, banned him from her Facebook page for a single night 
following an offensive comment by Davison.13 
The comment was made on a Facebook page titled “Chair Phyllis 
J. Randall,” which had been created and operated by Randall, in 
collaboration with her chief of staff, since the day before Randall was 
sworn into office.14 Randall’s avowed purpose in creating this page 
outside of the County’s official channels was to address and converse 
with Loudoun County residents without being constrained by the 
County’s official social media policies.15 This circumvention meant 
that Randall, rather than the County, would retain control over the 
page even after she left office.16 
Nevertheless, Randall categorized the page as “Government 
Official” in the “About” section of “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” and 
many of her posts “relate[d] to her work as Chair of the Loudoun 
County Board of Supervisors.”17 In fact, some posts even stated that 
they were submitted “[o]n behalf of the Loudoun County Board of 
Supervisors.”18 Such posts were occasionally offset by more 
“personal” posts on the page, including documentation of an afternoon 
shopping trip and a declaration of affection for the German language.19 
Some of the work-related posts Randall made promoted 
initiatives she created in her official capacity, documented meetings 
of the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, or encouraged 
attendance at events related to Randall’s work as Chair.20 One post 
concerned a joint town hall discussion held by the Loudoun County 
Board of Supervisors and the Loudoun County School Board.21 Soon 
 
 11. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 706. 
 12. Greenwood et al., supra note 9. 
 13. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 706, 710–11. 
 14. Id. at 707. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 708. 
 18. Id. at 709 (alteration in original). 
 19. Id. at 710. 
 20. Id. at 708–09. 
 21. Id. at 710. 
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thereafter, a Loudoun County resident by the name of Brian Davison 
commented on this posting and set the lawsuit into motion.22 Neither 
party supplied the exact wording of Davison’s comment, but it 
apparently alleged “corruption on the part of Loudoun County’s 
School Board involving conflicts of interests among the School Board 
and their family members.”23 Taking offense to the allegations against 
her colleagues on the school board, Randall deleted her post (including 
Davison’s reply) and subsequently banned Davison from her page.24 
The ban lasted no more than twelve hours and only prevented 
commenting on or private messaging to Randall’s page; it did not 
prevent reading that page or sharing content from that page on other 
pages.25 Even so, Davison (representing himself) filed a lawsuit 
alleging that Randall had acted under color of state law to deprive him 
of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.26 The court ultimately 
sided with Davison, finding that Randall’s actions against Davison 
violated his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment.27 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Davison court’s result rested on two key findings: (1) Randall 
acted under color of state law in operating the Facebook page, and (2) 
blocking Davison because of the viewpoint he expressed in his 
comment was unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.28 
A.  Color of State Law 
The court held that Randall acted under “color of state law” in 
maintaining her “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook page and in 
actually banning Davison from the page.29 It is key that Randall acted 
under color of state law because constitutional standards are only 
invoked when it can be said that the government is responsible for the 
conduct at issue.30 Davison’s claim that Randall violated his First 
Amendment rights hinged on Randall’s conduct being fairly 
 
 22. Id. at 706, 710. 
 23. Id. at 710–11. 
 24. Id. at 711. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 706. 
 27. Id. at 724. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 714. 
 30. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
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attributable to actions of the government rather than to Randall as a 
private citizen.31 
Citing Fourth Circuit precedent, the Davison court noted that 
“state action occurs where ‘apparently private actions . . . have a 
sufficiently close nexus with the State to be fairly treated as’ the 
actions of ‘the State itself.’”32 Moreover, “[w]hat constitutes a 
sufficient nexus is largely ‘a matter of normative judgment,’”33 and 
there “is ‘no specific formula’ for making this determination.”34 The 
Davison court finally noted that the totality of the circumstances 
should be weighed in determining whether conduct is attributable to 
the State.35 Thus, the Davison court assessed the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether Randall’s banning of Davison 
was conduct fairly attributable to the State.36 
The following factors weighed against a finding of state action: 
Randall’s official duties not including operation of a social media 
website, the page remaining under Randall’s control when she left 
office, Randall never using county-issued electronic devices to post on 
the page, and much of Randall’s social media activities taking place 
outside her office and normal working hours.37 
In contrast to the above points in Randall’s favor, the court 
identified many more factors tending to show the page’s operation was 
fairly attributable to the State. First, the impetus for Randall creating 
the page “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” a day before taking office was her 
victorious election.38 She had created the page specifically to address 
her new constituents, as evidenced by her redirecting supporters to 
visit this page from the one she had used while campaigning.39 
Moreover, Randall had consistently employed the page as a “tool 
of governance.”40 She had identified the page as a preferred means for 
back and forth constituent conversations and, to that end, used it to 
 
 31. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712. 
 32. Id. (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (some internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
 33. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (quoting Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523). 
 34. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712 (quoting Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 
2006)). 
 35. Id.; Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523 n.1. 
 36. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711–14. 
 37. Id. at 712. 
 38. Id. at 713. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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facilitate coordination of disaster relief efforts after a storm, and even 
to aid a constituent’s daughter in her effort to study abroad.41 Randall 
also used the page to promote participation in initiatives she headed, 
invite attendance at events related to her work as Chair, and keep 
constituents informed about her activities as Chair and of important 
events in local government.42 
The court also noted that Randall’s chief of staff, a salaried 
employee of the county, helped operate the page.43 Randall’s use of 
county resources to help manage “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” weighed 
against finding that the page was private.44 
Other factors weighing against the page being private included 
Randall categorizing the page as “government official,” the title of the 
page featuring Randall’s title as “Chair,” the page listing Randall’s 
official county contact information, many of the posts being addressed 
to Randall’s Loudoun County constituents, and the content posted 
generally tending toward matters related to Randall’s office.45 
The court concluded, based on the above, that the totality of the 
circumstances indicated that Randall had operated the page while 
“purporting to act under the authority vested in [her] by the state.”46 
The court concluded so despite occasional posts on “Chair Phyllis J. 
Randall” which detailed “personal” matters, such as an afternoon 
shopping trip, due to the stronger countervailing tendency toward 
posts that related to matters of Randall’s office.47 Moreover, the court 
further noted that the actual act of banning Davison had official 
implications as well because Randall had done so after taking offense 
to Davison’s comment criticizing other government officials on the 
county school board.48 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 714. 
 46. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes v. Halifax Cty. Sch. Bd., 855 F.2d 183, 186–
87 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
 47. Id. at 710, 714. 
 48. Id. at 714. 
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B.  Viewpoint-Based Discrimination 
Having found that Randall acted under color of state law, the 
court then concluded that Randall’s decision to ban Davison violated 
his First Amendment rights.49 
First, the court determined that Davison’s comment was protected 
speech.50 Despite the exact wording being unavailable, the court used 
the parties’ recollections of the comment to find that the comment 
contained ethical questions about conflicts of interest involving school 
board officials’ family members.51 The court noted that “such 
‘criticism of . . . official conduct’ [was] not just protected speech, but” 
also speech that lay at the very heart of the First Amendment.52 
Next, the court found that Randall had opened a forum for speech 
by creating the Facebook page.53 It backed this finding by referencing 
Fourth Circuit jurisprudence holding that the government may open 
fora for speech by creating websites “allow[ing] private persons to 
publish information.”54 The court also noted a recent Supreme Court 
decision likening social media platforms to traditional public fora 
where speech is protected, such as parks and streets.55 Even 
discounting the above, the court pointed out that Randall herself 
designated the page as a forum for speech by posting that she wanted 
“to hear from ANY Loudoun citizen on ANY issues, request, 
criticism, compliment, or just [his or her] thoughts.”56 
The court concluded that Randall “committed a cardinal sin under 
the First Amendment” by acting in her governmental capacity to delete 
Davison’s post for no other reason than because it offended her.57 This 
was despite the court’s admission that the consequences of Randall’s 
actions were minor—Davison was only banned for a single night and 
could have posted his message on multiple pages.58 Even so, the court 
held that the First Amendment roundly prohibited government 
 
 49. Id. at 715–16. 
 50. Id. at 716. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
 53. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716. 
 54. Id. (quoting Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008)). 
 55. Id. (citing Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 717–18. 
 58. Id. at 718. 
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suppression of “offensive” speech and applied with no less force in 
social media than in other types of fora.59 
The court closed the matter by clarifying that its ruling did not 
foreclose public officials from moderating comments on their social 
media.60 Rather, the conclusion reached here was based solely on a 
public official engaging in viewpoint-based discrimination against a 
private citizen within a forum for speech where the public official 
eschewed the use of neutral, comprehensive social media policies like 
Randall did with Loudoun County’s.61 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The proposition that public officials could violate the First 
Amendment when they remove offensive commentary or commenters 
from their social media account may seem to some like it came from 
a district court overstepping its bounds. Indeed, some commentators 
are either unsettled on Davison’s potential long-term worth62 or 
outright dismissive of the ruling’s legal bases.63 The court’s finding is 
nevertheless both legally solid and practically desirable. 
A.  Davison Is Built on Solid Legal Foundations 
The Davison court found that Randall acted under color of state 
law, thereby making her viewpoint-based discrimination against 
Davison a violation of the First Amendment.64 Though novel in 
dealing with the issue of when a government official’s actions through 
his or her social media page is treated as governmental,65 the court’s 
holding is reasonably derived from relevant precedent from both the 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Eugene Volokh, Some Help for Lawsuit Challenging Bans of Subscribers from 
@RealDonaldTrump, WASH. POST (July 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/27/some-help-for-lawsuit-challenging-bans-of-subscribers-from-
realdonaldtrump/?utm_term=.b16529b309ff. But see Venkat Balasubramani, Politician Can’t Ban 
Constituent from Her Official Facebook Page–Davison v. Loudoun County Supervisors, TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BLOG (July 27, 2017), http://blog.eric goldman.org/archives/ 2017/07/politician-
cant-ban-constituent-from-her-official-facebook-page-davison-v-loudoun-county-supervisors.htm 
(opining that Davison “could turn into consequential precedent for constraints on the ability of 
politicians . . . to block members of the public”). 
 63. See Thomas Wheatley, Why Social Media Is Not a Public Forum, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2017/08/04/why-social-
media-is-not-a-public-forum/?utm_term=.18e76a291e4c. 
 64. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 723. 
 65. Volokh, supra note 62. 
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Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeals. Moreover, the 
presumptive unconstitutionality of viewpoint-based discrimination by 
a government official against a private citizen is well-settled law.66 
1.  Color of State Law 
Victims of a First Amendment violation, like victims of any 
constitutional violation, may pursue damages against a state actor who 
infringes upon that right. Statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allow claims 
by private citizens against public officials who act under color of state 
law (as opposed to actual state action) to deprive private citizens of 
their constitutional rights.67 The Supreme Court has stated “that in a 
§1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement 
of action ‘under color of state law’ and the ‘state action’ requirement 
of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical.”68 Of this identical 
requirement for a finding of state action, the Supreme Court has held 
that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the 
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed 
its true significance.”69 Notably, conduct constituting “state action” 
satisfies the § 1983 requirement for conduct under color of state law.70 
From the above, the essential takeaway is that “state action” calls for 
looking at the totality of the circumstances and “color of state law” is 
satisfied if “state action” is found. 
Indeed, Davison concluded as much, having noted that a totality 
of the circumstances test used to find “state action” would also satisfy 
the “color of state law” requirement.71 Thus, the Davison court’s 
application of this test was proper. 
The facts the Davison court considered under the totality of the 
circumstances also comport with Supreme Court precedent. The 
Supreme Court has stated that “[w]hat is fairly attributable [to the 
state] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid 
simplicity. . . . [N]o one fact can function as a necessary condition 
across the board.”72 Furthermore, “there may be some countervailing 
 
 66. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 68. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982). 
 69. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
 70. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935. 
 71. Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 714 (E.D. Va. 2017), 
aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 
516, 523 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 72. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). 
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reason against attributing activity to the government.”73 In Davison, 
the factors that the court considered for finding a state action surely 
met this loose “normative judgment” standard.74 The Davison court 
also noted that no one fact was dispositive in making its decision, as 
the above Supreme Court precedent directs.75 Lastly, the Davison 
court did consider possible countervailing reasons against a finding of 
state action, such as the fact that Randall did not use county-owned 
electronics to post on social media.76 The court thus fairly applied 
precedent in determining the factors used to find that Randall acted 
under color of state law in her usage of “Chair Phyllis J. Randall.”77 
2.  Viewpoint-Based Discrimination 
The Supreme Court has stated that “the right of free speech is not 
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”78 Thus, if the speech 
at issue falls within one of the enumerated categories of unprotected 
speech, there is no First Amendment violation.79 The speech at issue 
in Davison was a Facebook comment raising ethical questions about 
the Loudoun County School Board, which the court characterized as 
speech critical of official conduct.80 Such “[o]pen speech by a private 
citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the heart of expression 
subject to protection by the First Amendment.”81 Thus, Davison’s 
comment was speech protected by the First Amendment.82 
Moreover, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not regulate 
speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.”83 
Such viewpoint-based discrimination is presumptively impermissible 
even in forums with otherwise valid restrictions on protected speech, 
i.e., limited public forums.84 For this reason, Randall’s suppression of 
 
 73. Id. at 295–96. 
 74. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 714. 
 78. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 79. See id. at 571–72. 
 80. Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714. 
 81. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 428 (2006) (5-4 decision) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 82. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 720. 
 83. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828, 830 (1995)  (finding 
that a public university’s exclusion of a student group’s religious newspaper from accessing the 
“student activities fund” otherwise provided to secular groups was viewpoint-based discrimination 
because the fund qualified as a “metaphysical” forum). 
 84. Id. at 829–30. 
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Davison’s speech purely for its offensive content made determining 
the type of forum unnecessary, so long as the comment section of the  
“Chair Phyllis J. Randall” page was indeed a forum.85 
On that forum issue, the Supreme Court has found that 
metaphysical fora for speech are subject to the same protections as 
spatial or geographic fora.86 It is likely that social media platforms like 
Facebook, at least on pages created by government officials like 
Randall, are such metaphysical fora where First Amendment 
protections against viewpoint-based exclusion apply.87 Thus, the 
Davison court correctly concluded that Randall engaged in viewpoint-
based discrimination against Davison.88 
One critic of the Davison decision argued that because users agree 
to the Facebook Terms of Service which “provides users the 
unqualified ability to ‘avoid distasteful or offensive content’ by 
unfriending, blocking and even reporting other users,” the courts 
cannot alter or limit the site’s rules.89 However, First Amendment 
protections for citizens against government censorship do not cease by 
virtue of the interaction occurring on a privately-owned social media 
platform; the same is true when a government agency rents a physical 
space in a private building to hold a public meeting.90 Thus, the 
Davison court’s finding rested on overall solid legal foundations. 
B.  The Davison Case Presents a Practical Guideline for Future 
Cases Involving Social Media and the First Amendment 
1.  The Factors Found in Davison are Transferrable to Other Social 
Media Cases 
Many in the United States would be unsurprised to discover that 
social media platforms are a prevalent aspect of the average person’s 
life.91 Indeed, even the Supreme Court acknowledged that for many, 
 
 85. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17. 
 86. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
 87. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 1994–96; see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 
1730, 1735 (2017) (likening “metaphysical” social media platforms such as Facebook to 
quintessential spatial or geographic forums for speech like streets and parks). 
 88. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 716. 
 89. Wheatley, supra note 63. 
 90. Eugene Volokh, More on the First Amendment and @RealDonaldTrump, WASH. POST 
(June 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/14/more-
on-the-first-amendment-and-realdonaldtrump/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.9d18c5c22742; accord 
Lidsky, supra note 10, at 1996. 
 91. Greenwood et al., supra note 9. 
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social media platforms “are the principal sources for knowing current 
events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the 
modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of 
human thought and knowledge.”92 Given this understanding of social 
media’s importance and prevalence, it is crucial that the courts define 
the limits of government officials’ use of such platforms. 
Davison is therefore notable in providing a guideline for defining 
these limits. As noted above, Davison is rooted in firm precedent.93 
Moreover, in determining when a social media account maintained by 
a public official is sufficiently governmental to be subject to 
constitutional constraints, the court applied the proper “normative 
judgment” standard to select the factors to weigh under the totality of 
the circumstances.94 These factors included whether the official’s 
duties involved maintenance of a social media website, whether the 
account was used during the official’s work hours, the purpose for the 
creation of the social media page, how the page was used, who the 
intended audience was, whether government resources were involved, 
the extent that the page referenced its creator’s office, and whether the 
speech was suppressed for an “official” reason.95 Along with other 
factors derived from a normative judgment of the facts, these 
considerations could be directly applied to any case involving a 
government official who used social media in an official capacity. 
2.  Davison Reasonably Advocates for Policies to Guide Discussion 
and Avoid First Amendment Issues 
As the Davison court notes, government officials can avoid 
liability for moderating their pages by setting up comprehensive rules 
to guide the discussion beforehand.96 Indeed, the court acknowledges 
that “a degree of moderation is necessary to preserve social media 
websites as useful forums for the exchange of ideas.”97 This may be 
the court’s implicit admission of the “disinhibiting effect.”98 The 
disinhibiting effect refers to the increased tendency of a speaker to 
 
 92. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. 
 93. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 94.  Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. 2017), 
aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 95. See id. at 711–15. 
 96. See id. at 718, 721. 
 97. Id. at 718. 
 98. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 2025. 
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engage in profane and abusive speech whenever communication is 
computer-mediated and the speaker believes he or she is anonymous.99 
At first, it may seem incongruous with the overall holding of 
Davison to suggest that government officials may simply restrict 
speech so long as they set up discussion rules beforehand.100 However, 
several circuits have found that certain reasonable or viewpoint-
neutral restrictions against profane remarks in the context of city 
council meetings were acceptable.101 The reason that such restrictions 
on speech were allowed is that the unfiltered allowance of any remark 
under any circumstance could make it difficult to accomplish the 
business that those proceedings were scheduled for.102 For instance, a 
governmental entity running a planning commission meeting is 
allowed to limit discussion to specified agenda items and impose 
restrictions against off-topic matters including personal attacks against 
others.103 Given both the disinhibiting effect and the fact that 
viewpoint-neutral rules are acceptable in such real-world spaces, there 
is similarly good reason to encourage the adoption of such rules in a 
social media context.104 Davison, which was based off the comparison 
of social media platforms to a modern public forum,105 merely 
expands upon the above reasoning.106 The Davison court even noted, 
despite their overall verdict, that Randall remained free to adopt new 
policies for the “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” page or disallow comments 
altogether if she chose to do so.107 
C.  Application to Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump 
The following is an illustration of how the factors considered in 
Davison may apply to Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump and 
future cases where there is a dispute over whether a social media 
account is “governmental” enough, such that suppression of a private 
citizen’s speech triggers a possible violation of the First Amendment. 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 718. 
 101. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 2000–01. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Steinburg v. Chesterfield Cty. Planning Comm’n, 527 F.3d 377, 384–85, 387 (4th Cir. 
2008). 
 104. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 2000–01. 
 105. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
 106. See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va. 
2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) 
 107. Id. at 723. 
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This illustration also demonstrates that Davison’s instructional scope 
is not simply limited to cases involving Facebook.108 
1.  Statement of the Case 
This developing case is based around Twitter, a social media 
platform used by 24% of online adults.109 Users of the service may 
send out “tweets,” or posts, which are both relayed to users that have 
“followed” that user and are otherwise displayed publicly.110 Users 
may also send reply tweets to other users’ tweets, or even reply to the 
replies of others; the collection of replies and replies-to-replies, which 
appear under a base tweet, are sometimes called “comment 
threads.”111 Lastly, users have the option of “blocking” other users, 
thereby “restricting specific accounts from contacting them, seeing 
their tweets, and following them.”112 
The complaint identifies seven Twitter users, collectively referred 
to as the “Individual Plaintiffs,” that were allegedly blocked from the 
@realDonaldTrump account “because of opinions they expressed in 
replies to the President’s tweets.”113 One example offered by the 
complaint is the blocking of Plaintiff Brandon Neely for a tweet he 
made to @realDonaldTrump on June 12, 2017.114 In response to 
President Trump’s tweet congratulating the “First new Coal Mine of 
Trump Era” opening in Pennsylvania, Neely tweeted: “Congrats and 
now black lung won’t be covered under #TrumpCare.”115 Neely 
discovered the next day that @realDonaldTrump had blocked him, 
thus rendering him unable to contact, view, or otherwise interact with 
President Trump’s tweets or associated comment threads.116 Plaintiff 
argued that such viewpoint-based discrimination by Defendants was 
 
 108. The feasibility of the case concerning jurisdiction or issues of constitutional separation of 
powers as raised by Defendants in their motion for summary judgment are not considered here. See 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 8, Knight First 
Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 17-cv-
05205) [hereinafter Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
 109. Greenwood et al., supra note 9. 
 110. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 8, 11. 
 111. Id. at 9; About Replies and Mentions, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-
twitter/mentions-and-replies (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 112. How to Block Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018). 
 113. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
 114. Id. at 21. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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unconstitutional and that the Individual Plaintiffs were entitled to an 
injunction preventing such conduct in the future.117 
2.  @realDonaldTrump Is Likely Governmental and Defendants 
Likely Engaged in Unconstitutional Viewpoint-Based Exclusion 
The complaint lays out its argument similarly to the reasoning of 
the Davison court. First, the complaint identifies several factors 
indicating that @realDonaldTrump is an official government account 
rather than a private personal account.118 The complaint then 
concludes that because the account was governmental, the 
viewpoint-based suppression of the Individual Plaintiffs was 
unconstitutional.119 
a.  @realDonaldTrump is likely sufficiently governmental 
As noted above, the Davison court essentially conducted a “state 
action” analysis that led to the conclusion that Randall acted under 
color of state law in blocking Davison on Facebook.120 This decision 
was the result of the court’s normative assessment of pertinent facts 
tending to prove or disprove that the page was used in an official 
capacity.121 
Here, there are a few Davison factors weighing against a finding 
of state action. First, the enumerated duties of the official in question 
do not include the maintenance of a social media website.122 President 
Trump also possessed the @realDonaldTrump account for eight years 
prior to his inauguration,123 indicating that he will likely continue to 
possess the account after he leaves office and that the account was not 
set up in anticipation of his presidency.124 Additionally, while there 
has been debate as to whether and to what extent President Trump used 
a personal phone for tweeting or entrusted the task to his staff, it is 
possible that the devices used are at least a mix of personal- and 
 
 117. Id. at 25. 
 118. See id. at 2. 
 119. Id. at 2–3. 
 120. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 121. Id.  
 122. See U.S. CONST. art. II;  Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
702, 712 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019); Motion 
for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 12. 
 123. Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 108, at 2. 
 124. See id. at 12. 
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government-owned.125 The use of a personal device, of course, would 
tend to show private use.126 Finally, setting aside that the working 
hours of a President are likely erratic, President Trump’s admission 
that he tweets from bed confirms that he does not limit his Twitter use 
to working hours.127 
The factors above, weighing toward private use, roughly 
correspond with those considered by the Davison court, but are not 
exhaustive; the facts of individual cases are subject to “normative 
judgment,” and other factors may be found weighing toward the 
account being private.128 For example, a court might consider the 
whole of @realDonaldTrump by comparing the eight years of tweets 
prior to President Trump’s inauguration to after he took office and find 
that this history as a non-governmental account strongly indicated that 
the account was private. 
However, many Davison factors support a finding of state action 
here.129 First, Defendants “use the account to make formal 
announcements, defend the President’s official actions, report on 
meetings with foreign leaders, and promote the administration’s 
positions on health care, immigration, foreign affairs, and other 
matters.”130 This usage is reminiscent (albeit at a national scale) of the 
ways Randall used her Facebook page; she also consistently addressed 
her constituents and promoted certain policy initiatives as part of her 
work in office.131 Notably, such tweets by @realDonaldTrump are 
considered official enough that the National Archives and Records 
Administration advised the White House that these tweets had to be 
preserved under the Presidential Records Act.132 The Ninth Circuit, 
with the understanding that the President’s tweets were official 
statements of the President, even referenced one of these tweets in 
 
 125. See Kaveh Waddell, Is Trump Still Tweeting from His Unsecured Android Phone?, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/trump-
android-tweets/520869/. 
 126. See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 712 (E.D. Va. 
2017), aff’d sub nom. Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 127. See Nick Visser, Trump Finally Says It: He Tweets from Bed, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 
2018, 9:49 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-tweets-from-bed_us_ 
5a6e66aae4b0ddb658c78a0e. 
 128. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 712. 
 129. See id.  at 714. 
 130. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2, 14. 
 131. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 713. 
 132. Complaint, supra note 1, at 15. 
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striking down President Trump’s temporary travel-ban of nationals 
from certain countries.133 
Moreover, like Randall, President Trump and his staff used 
government resources to manage the account.134 Members of 
President Trump’s staff (then-White House Press Secretary Sean 
Spicer and White House Social Media Director Daniel Scavino) 
helped operate @realDonaldTrump; Daniel Scavino even 
occasionally posted tweets on President Trump’s behalf.135 
Additionally, like Randall’s “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” page, the 
@realDonaldTrump page is swathed in references to the office: the 
account is registered to the “45th President of the United States of 
America, Washington, D.C.,” the header photograph sometimes 
displays President Trump performing official duties like making 
speeches, and many posts announce policies or decisions not yet made 
on any other official channel.136 One post from @realDonaldTrump 
even stated that “ My use of social media is not Presidential—it’s 
MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL.”137 
Lastly, the actual act of blocking the Individual Plaintiffs could 
also be seen as indicative of state action. As with Randall’s 
suppression of Davison for criticizing the conduct of government 
officials, Defendants blocked the Individual Plaintiffs like Plaintiff 
Neely following criticism they leveled toward the President.138 
Weighing the totality of the circumstances, it is likely that a court 
would find that @realDonaldTrump was an official, rather than 
personal, account. 
That being the case, it would be difficult for Defendants to argue 
that there was no viewpoint-based exclusion of the Individual 
Plaintiffs. As with Plaintiff Neely’s biting remark about President 
Trump’s future healthcare policy,139 the Individual Plaintiffs were 
 
 133. Id. (citing Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017)); see also Ali Vitali, Trump’s Tweets ‘Official Statements,’ Spicer 
Says, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2017, 5:02 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-
s-tweets-official-statements-spicer-says-n768931 (noting former White House Press Secretary 
Sean Spicer’s statement that “the president is president [sic] of the United States, so [the Tweets] 
are considered official statements by the president of the United States”). 
 134. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 713; see Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
 135. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 4–5, 14–15. 
 136. See id. at 13–14. 
 137. Id. at 13. 
 138. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714; see Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3, 21. 
 139. Complaint, supra note 1, at 21. 
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criticizing official conduct and therefore engaging in protected speech, 
which is at the very heart of the First Amendment.140 Because 
President Trump blocked the Individual Plaintiffs shortly after such 
critical speech, thereby taking away their ability to engage with 
@realDonaldTrump through their accounts, he discriminated on the 
basis of the viewpoints expressed.141 Moreover, it is likely that the 
comment threads associated with @realDonaldTrump’s posts are fora 
for speech. Defendants consistently promoted @realDonaldTrump as 
a channel for official communication and did not prevent access to the 
tweets to anyone except the blocked Plaintiffs.142 If 
@realDonaldTrump truly is an official account, as Davison indicates 
it is, this viewpoint-based exclusion of the Individual Plaintiffs, in the 
absence of any policies limiting the speech of commenters, violates 
the First Amendment.143 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Davison case is very much a product of our times; social 
media continues to grow ever more prevalent in the lives of many, and 
heretofore unresolved (or unasked) questions, such as the First 
Amendment concerns discussed above, will have to be addressed. 
Even setting aside President Trump’s notable use of social media, 
there remain government officials like Randall who interact with their 
constituencies through such platforms. This is natural given the 
efficiency and ease of interacting with one’s base in this way. 
However, the question of whether and to what extent the Constitution 
follows such officials to their social media accounts must therefore be 
considered. For its part, Davison does this quite well. Reasonably 
derived from existing precedent, the case provides a methodology with 
relevant factors to consider in weighing whether a government 
official’s social media use triggers a First Amendment issue. As such, 
Davison offers an instructive blueprint for future cases dealing with 
government officials’ suppression of private citizens’ speech on social 
media. 
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